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Abstract The standard response to engineering disasters like the Deepwater
Horizon case is to ascribe full moral responsibility to individuals and to collectives
treated as individuals. However, this approach is inappropriate since concrete action
and experience in engineering contexts seldom meets the criteria of our traditional
moral theories. Technological action is often distributed rather than individual or
collective, we lack full control of the technology and its consequences, and we lack
knowledge and are uncertain about these consequences. In this paper, I analyse these
problemsbyemployingKierkegaardiannotionsoftragedyandmoralresponsibilityin
order to account for experiences of the tragic in technological action. I argue that
ascription of responsibility in engineering contexts should be sensitive to personal
experiences of lack of control, uncertainty, role conﬂicts, social dependence, and
tragic choice. I conclude that this does not justify evading individual and corporate
responsibility, but inspires practices of responsibility ascription that are less ‘harsh’
on those directly involved in technological action, that listen to their personal expe-
riences, and that encourage them to gain more knowledge about what they are doing.
Keywords Moral responsibility  Engineering  Technology  Tragedy 
Kierkegaard  Deepwater Horizon
Introduction: The Problem of Responsibility Ascription in Engineering
Contexts
On April 20, 2010 the drilling rig Deepwater Horizon exploded as a result of a
wellhead blowout, killing 11 platform workers and causing an oil spill in the Gulf of
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DOI 10.1007/s11948-010-9233-3Mexico. Causes of the accident suggested by the media include a failing blowout
preventer, which was meant to stop the ﬂow after a blowout, improper cementing of
the well, and lacking regulatory oversight. After the accident, several attempts to
stop the leak failed. Almost 3 months later, on July 15, a cap was put on the well
and in August BP announced that a so-called ‘static kill’ procedure (pumping mud
into the well) has been successful and stopped the oil. The oil spill has damaged
marine and wildlife habitats as well as ﬁshing and other economic activities. The
case invokes images of other offshore accidents such as Piper Alpha in 1988
(explosion of a platform in the North Sea) and the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989
(tanker ran aground near Alaska).
In the wake of this disaster, moral responsibility has been mainly ascribed to
individuals and collectives treated as individuals: BP (the oil company), Tony
Hayward (BP), Barack Obama, the US Government (the regulator), and several
(other) companies. This way of thinking about moral responsibility is understand-
able and at ﬁrst sight seems entirely justiﬁed. However, this approach is also
exemplary of some signiﬁcant limitations of our traditional theories of moral
responsibility.
The conditions for attributing moral responsibility prescribed by traditional
theories make demands on agency, control, and knowledge that are seldom met in
engineering and—more generally speaking—technological action. It is usually
assumed that responsibility is individual and in line with Aristotle’s (1925)
discussion in the Nicomachean Ethics (Book III, 1109b30-1111b5) a distinction is
made between two negative conditions for ascribing moral responsibility: one
should not be forced to do something (control condition) and one must not be
ignorant of what one is doing (knowledge condition). These conditions are often
problematic. For example, in the literature there have been discussions about how
tenable the control condition is given the inﬂuence of character, circumstances, and
consequences (Nagel 1979) and given that persons sometimes lack attention to
crucial elements of the situation, exercise poor judgment, or lack moral insight and
imagination (Sher 2006). However, in the case of technological action it appears
even more difﬁcult to meet the conditions. Let me give some reasons why the reality
of technological action and experience, for example in engineering, is far removed
from what the traditional approach and criteria assume and require.
First, both in philosophical analysis and in practice it is often assumed that
responsibility is mainly or exclusively individual. In engineering ethics, philosophers
focus on the application of moral principles to individual actions, for example by
means of a codes of ethics (Davis 1991), or on the virtues of individual engineers
(Harris 2008). And in our legal systems individuals (and collectives like companies
treated as individuals) are held legally responsible. But technological action is often
distributed and collective rather than individual (Lenk and Maring 2001, p. 100). As
Ger Wackers and I have shown for the case of the Snorre A gas blowout (a near
disaster with an oil and gas production platform in the North Sea), responsibility
should be understood as distributed between various actors at various levels and
times (Coeckelbergh and Wackers 2007). Recently I suggested in a contribution to
the Guardian that this is also true in the Deepwater Horizon case: responsible actors
include many companies involved, the ﬁnancial actors, the regulators and politicians,
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current regulatory frameworks.
1 However, our traditional practices of responsibility
ascription are ill equipped to deal with such a broad distribution of responsibility. It is
easier to blame or prosecute only individuals directly involved and clearly deﬁned
and visible organisations and institutions like BP and the US Government.
Second, regardless of our (individual) intentions and (individual) capacity of self-
control, we usually lack full control of the technology and its consequences. We
may enjoy external, negative freedom in the sense that there is no-one who tells us
what to do (we sometimes wish there was one, since the freedom is hard to bear) and
we may also have internal freedom (control over our desires). But even if we have
no master and if we master ourselves, the major problem is that we cannot control
the consequences of technological action; it escapes the boundaries of what we and
others intend and can control. In cases where possibilities to control are very
limited, we might decide not to develop or use the technology for that reason.
However, if and when we use it (for instance because we already depend on it for
our way of living), we want to be able to ascribe responsibility for technological
action. For example, it is likely that in the Deepwater Horizon case most people who
contributed to the disaster were not ‘forced’ to do what they did; yet the cumulative
outcome of their actions (or the outcomes of failures to act in the right way)
combined with circumstances they did not control resulted in the disaster.
Moreover, it appears that as an oil consumer I have little control over the
consequences of my consumption. As with food and (other) mass produced
consumer goods, we often have no idea where the products comes from, how they
are produced, which risks and costs that way of production incurs, etc. Furthermore,
once the blow-out accident happened, there was a general failure to control its
consequences. Now failure to control is an instance of wrongdoing if one has the
possibility to control. But what if this condition is only partly fulﬁlled what if there
is very little space for action? Does that imply that no-one is responsible? How
meaningful is the control condition anyway with regard to technological action?
Third, as the examples show, the control condition depends on knowledge: we
lack knowledge and are uncertain about the consequences of the technology. This
uncertainty is not only due to unpredictability of the future as such, but also to the
scale and complexity of the technological-social world in which we act and which
we shape by our actions. In previous work I argued that in engineering contexts
moral responsibility is ascribed under epistemic conditions of opacity: between the
actions of an engineer and the eventual consequences of her actions lies a world of
relationships, people, things, time, and space. This lack of epistemic transparency
makes it difﬁcult to deﬁne the nature and scope of technological action. For
instance, we can foresee some potential consequences of technological action but
not all potential consequences. In the Deepwater Horizon case, it is unclear if
people could have foreseen (1) that the blowout preventer would not function under
these circumstances, (2) that initial attempts to stop the blowout would fail, and (3)
all consequences of that failure and those actions. Moreover, in technological action
1 See http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/jun/09/deepwater-horizon-oil-spill-
responsibility-bp.
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and between our actions and (bad) luck (Coeckelbergh 2010a). What happens (e.g.
an accident) is the outcome of many actions and events—some which cannot be
controlled. This amounts to saying that in a very real sense ‘we don’t know what
we’re doing’ when it comes to technological action and engineering practice. Of
course as individual users, designers, etc. we know what we do in the sense that we
know our tasks, roles, and direct actions. But how these contribute to the larger
technological action and engineering practice is not entirely clear to any single
individual. Again, it seems that if we use the traditional criteria, it is difﬁcult to
ascribe moral responsibility. In the Gulf oil spill case, for example, most citizens
who voted for politicians who maintained a deﬁcient regulatory framework seemed
unaware of the risks they created for the environment.
In the remainder of this paper, I analyse these problems concerning responsibility
ascription by using the concept of tragedy. Responding to the philosophical
tradition, I will ﬁrst distinguish between different meanings of tragedy and its
relation to technology. Then I will construct a Kierkegaardian notion of moral
responsibility that accounts for experiences of the tragic in technological culture and
engineering contexts. Thus, I do not only introduce the idea of tragedy in thinking
about engineering, but I also give it a new interpretation. In this way I hope to
contribute to exploring new ways of ascribing responsibility in engineering contexts
and hence to avoiding a fatalist or defeatist response to the problems with meeting
the conditions of responsibility. In the course of my arguments I provided examples
relating to offshore engineering, in particular the Deepwater Horizon case.
Inspired by Kierkegaard I ﬁrst construct a notion of tragic action and
responsibility that does not promote fatalism or passivity. Instead of resolving the
tension between freedom and fate, it identiﬁes this tension as the heart of tragic
experience.
Then I apply this concept to the problem of responsibility ascription in
technological, engineering contexts. I argue that such ascription should be sensitive
to personal experiences of helplessness when lacking full control, being over-
whelmed by unexpected events, uncertainty about the future, inability to resolve
conﬂicts between responsibilities related to different roles and social relations,
feeling highly dependent on what others do, being part of a story one can neither
control nor predict, and having to choose when no option appears ‘right’.
Although my discussion and examples will mainly concern backward-looking
responsibility (responsibility ascription after something bad has happened, retro-
spective responsibility), I will also indicate how my reﬂections can be useful for
forward-looking responsibility (responsibility ascription in order to prevent bad
things to happen, prospective responsibility).
2
I end with conclusions about how to ascribe responsibility in technology and
engineering contexts given the discussed relations between moral responsibility,
knowledge, and tragedy.
2 For a discussion of the distinction in relation to engineering see for instance Nihle ´n Fahlquist (2006).
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Before I develop a Kierkegaardian view of tragedy and responsibility, let me ﬁrst
say more about tragedy and its relation to technology. This is important for my
argument since I will construct a speciﬁc view of tragedy that is distinct from both
common usage and usage in an inﬂuential body of (philosophical) literature.
Tragedy and Technology
In daily speech ‘tragedy’ usually means ‘terrible’, ‘awful’, or ‘catastrophic’. For
instance, the accident with Deepwater Horizon can be called ‘tragic’ in the sense
that people died and were injured and that the environment was damaged. In his
paper, however, I use the term ‘tragic’ in a sense that refers back to ancient Greek
tragedy and its reception in the history of philosophy.
There is a tradition in philosophy which understands modern culture as
essentially untragic. It is claimed that in our obsession with rationality and control
we lost a sense for fate. Steiner thought that in modern times we succeeded in
destroying our sense of tragedy (Steiner 1961). Technology, it appears, is the very
opposite of a tragic sense: it is a means to tame fate, as de Mul phrased it (de Mul
2006). Steiner stands in a tradition of thought that turned to ancient Greek tragedy as
a remedy for modern non-tragic culture and technology. Nietzsche and Heidegger
also argued that we need to recover our sense of tragedy as a cure for our obsession
with control and mastery of nature—our obsession with technology.
3
If this were true, then by deﬁnition oil production, as a technology, could easily
be interpreted as part of a ‘sick’ technological culture that exploits nature and we
should ‘return to nature’ and to the tragic understanding of life. In this view,
accidents such as Deepwater Horizon could be interpreted as a kind of divine
punishment for what the ancient Greeks called hybris: technology displays
arrogance and lack of humility. However, I do not adopt this conception of tragedy
and its relation to technology for at least the following reasons.
First, these views are too Romantic in assuming that we can make a strict
distinction between on the one hand, ‘nature’ that functions ‘on its own terms’
4 and,
on the other hand, human culture and human experience. Instead, we have always
transformed nature and in this sense Greek culture was as much ‘technological’ as it
was tragic. Modern oil production is different from ancient means of energy
production, of course, but in a sense nature has always been used as an energy
3 Nietzsche’s antinomy between the Apollonian and the Dionysian in The Birth of Tragedy (1872) and
Heidegger’s reading of Ho ¨lderlin, his notion of Gelassenheit, and his thoughts in ‘The Question
Concerning Technology’ (1953) can be interpreted as such recovery operations. They were based on the
assumption that technology and modernity are radically untragic. Both thinkers promote (their
interpretation of) ancient tragedy as remedy for a modern culture obsessed with control and mastery of
nature.
4 Heidegger argued that we use nature as a standing-reserve, something to be used for our purposes.
Pattison has summarized Heidegger’s view of technology as follows: ‘In the interaction with nature that
occurs in technology, nature is no longer allowed to function or to become manifest on its own terms, but
is transformed into a quantiﬁable resource, into energy that can be abstracted from and stored and
disposed of independently of its originating context.’ (Pattison 2000, p. 54).
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want, of course, but we cannot ‘switch off’ technology. Technology is an important
aspect of what we do and what we are: we have always been technological beings
and to stop being technological would be to stop being human altogether.
Second, it is not clear that today we have lost our sense of tragedy. Perhaps it has
not been promoted in modern culture, but as de Mul has argued, technology can give
us a sense of the tragic as well (de Mul 2006).
5 De Mul uses in his work the stories
of Prometheus (the tragedy Prometheus Unbound) and the monster of Frankenstein.
Technology appears to us as something we created but which then escapes our (full)
control. For example, the Deepwater Horizon case is not only tragic in the common
sense noted above, but is also tragic in a deeper way since the disaster and failing
human efforts to cope with the disaster reveal to us how little control we have over
the consequences of our technological actions. Disasters such as this show how
vulnerable we and our technological systems are, and how dependent we are on our
technologies and our natural environment.
Third, and most important for my following argument, my conception of tragedy
rejects Nietzsche’s, Heidegger’s, and de Mul’s fatalistic interpretation of tragedy.
To (re)discover the tragic in technology does not imply that we have to set up
technology as an autonomous force, a new god or demon which keeps us in the
chains of fate and which we have to accept. Technological practice already includes
the struggle and attempts to escape fate at two ‘moments’ or levels. As de Mul has
argued, technology is itself a means to tame fate (we try to gain mastery of nature).
But in addition, our attempts to perceive, assess, and reduce the risks associated
with that technology are secondary attempts at mastery: we try to gain mastery of
the technology (not only of nature).
6 Thus, when I call experience in technological
culture and engineering ‘tragic’ I do not refer to (the acceptance of) fate but to the
dynamics between, on the one hand, the experience of fate, luck, and contingency
and, on the other hand, how we respond to these events and experiences as beings
that are free and in control to some extent. For example, the responses to the
Deepwater Horizon case (efforts to gain control over the well, efforts to contain the
oil spill, political actions, etc.) and the struggles and failures related to them are as
much part of the ‘tragedy’ as the more ‘fatalistic’ (experiences of the) initial events
and their direct consequences. Below I will construct a view of the tragic that does
not resolve the tension between (experiences of) freedom and (experiences of) fate
but instead identiﬁes this tension as the core of tragedy and tragic experience.
Finally, in contrast to treating technology as one thing (as Heidegger did:
technology as an attitude or way of seeing the world), we should break up the term
5 However, de Mul’s thinking has a recovery dimension to it: he writes about ‘the rebirth of tragedy from
the spirit of technology’. This assumes that tragedy has already died and that contemporary technology
revives it. I insist that the tragic experience has never died in the ﬁrst place. Not only contemporary ‘post-
modern’ technological culture is tragic; modern technological culture too has given rise to tragic
experiences. (A Heideggerian could of course reply that the reason why we fail to perceive the tragic in
technology is that we are in the ban of technology as a way of seeing the world. But I believe this is not
true: we do experience the tragic in technology but at most we do not always have access to adequate
concepts to express our experience).
6 These two efforts cannot be completely separated; the consequences of technology and the
consequences of our attempts to regain mastery of it are intertwined—as is ‘nature’ and ‘culture’.
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the tragic character of technological culture as a whole, but explore tragic
experiences in concrete technological and engineering practices such as oil
production. In the following pages I sketch a framework that can guide this
exploration and draw conclusions for thinking about moral responsibility in
engineering and other technological practices.
A Kierkegaardian View of Tragedy and Moral Responsibility
Kierkegaard suggests an interesting interpretation of tragedy and moral responsi-
bility which avoids the one-sided fatalistic interpretation and allows us to attend to
experiences of the tragic in engineering.
In ‘The Ancient Tragical Motif as Reﬂected in the Modern’ (1843) Kierkegaard
contrasts modern tragedy with ancient tragedy. He argues that the ‘action in Greek
tragedy is intermediate between activity and passivity (action and suffering)’
(Kierkegaard 1843, p. 117). Although the characters in ancient tragedy rested ‘in the
substantial categories, of state, family, and destiny’—this is what Kierkegaard calls
the ‘‘fatalistic’’ element in Greek tragedy (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 116)—there was
also activity. The heroes were not passive. Kierkegaard means that we do not only
suffer from fate, but we also contribute to what happens (to us). We always have
some control. If, on the other hand, we had full control over everything, our lives
would also loose their tragic character. There would be no struggle. Thus, it appears
that human, tragic action occurs ‘in-between’ these two extremes, as mixtures of
suffering and activity. If this is true, to recognise the tragic is not to accept fate but
to recognise that we have to live within the tension between freedom and fate,
activity and passivity, control and lack of control.
Is this deplorable? My point here is not that tragedy is ‘bad’ (deplorable) or
‘good’ (valuable) in the way an event or accident is bad or good. It is rather a basic
feature of the human condition which structures our possibilities for action: we can
only act in the space between freedom and fate. Understood in this speciﬁc way,
tragedy is not the word we normally use to express concrete experiences of
limitations to human control (e.g. when an accident happens in which we had a
hand), but rather the condition of possibility for such experiences. It is because
human action is often deeply tragic (in the speciﬁc sense I elaborated above) that we
can be helpless, sad, and so on after particular events for which we were only partly
responsible—or indeed experience joy and happiness when, partly beyond our
control, something good befalls us. Of course one may also deplore tragedy as a
feature of human action and of the human condition (being in-between, on the one
hand, all-powerful gods and, on the other hand, things that are only acted upon). But
then we should remind ourselves that good and happiness also spring from this
condition.
7
7 See also Nussbaum’s argument in The Fragility of Goodness (1986): vulnerability is not only a source
of peril but also of good. Note also that in many European languages the word for happiness is related to
what happens to us, to luck. For example, the English word ‘‘happiness’’ stems from ‘‘hap’’ (chance,
fortune) and the Dutch word ‘‘geluk’’ means happiness but also chance, being lucky.
From Kierkegaard to Offshore Engineering 41
123This notion of tragic action seems applicable to technological action in
engineering. On the one hand, engineers, managers, and others involved in
technological practices like oil production have control over their actions and the
consequences of their actions. However, if Kierkegaard is right then it is pointless to
strive for full, absolute control, since it is in the nature of tragic human action that
we can never have that; there will be always events and things that we cannot
control and there will always be struggle and suffering as a result of that lack of
control.
With regard to the control condition, then, my position is not that the control
condition is not fulﬁlled (and that therefore some people might be ‘excused’), but
rather that there is something wrong with the criterion itself if it assumes the
possibility of full control, since such a condition cannot be fulﬁlled with regard to
human technological action given the tragic nature of that action.
Does this mean that engineers, managers, consumers, and so on, are not
responsible at all? Once again it seems that responsibility ascription becomes highly
problematic since full control is lacking. But there is a way to conceive of
responsibility that accounts for the ‘mixed’ nature of tragic action. Kierkegaard
draws the following consequences for the question of responsibility (he uses the
term ‘guilt’):
just as the action in Greek tragedy is intermediate between activity and
passivity (action and suffering), so is also the hero’s guilt, and therein lies the
tragic collision. […] The tragedy lies between these two extremes. If the
individual is entirely without guilt, then the tragic interest is nulliﬁed […]; if,
on the other hand, he is absolutely guilty, he can no longer interest us
tragically. (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 117)
For Kierkegaard, modern tragedy misunderstands the tragic by making the
hero absolutely responsible, making him ‘accountable for everything’ (Kierkeg-
aard 1843, p. 117). Instead, he says that the tragic has in it ‘‘an inﬁnite
gentleness’’ as opposed to the ethical which is ‘strict and harsh’ (Kierkegaard
1843, p. 118). The hero is not responsible for everything since not everything is
in his power.
We can learn from this interpretation of the tragic for revising our ways of
ascribing responsibility in engineering contexts. In so far as technological,
engineering action is ‘tragic’ action (intermediate between activity and passivity),
it is appropriate to ascribe responsibility in a more ‘gentle’ way since
responsibility is not absolute but gradual. This is an answer to the problem
with the control condition introduced in the beginning of this article: technological
action is not a matter of having either full control or no control. We usually have
some control. Similarly, knowledge is a matter of degree. Therefore, where
technological action is concerned the question is not whether or not a person is
responsible, but to what extent a person is responsible. For example, in cases such
as Deepwater Horizon, the main actors (engineers, managers, politicians,
consumers) are not independent gods who enjoy full control over their creation
but engage in tragic, all too human action in which there is also passivity vis-a `-vis
the many natural, social, and other forces and inﬂuences that co-shape and
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there and which functions in the same way as the ‘substantial’ categories
Kierkegaard identiﬁed in ancient Greece. They have already been assigned roles
and ﬁnd themselves in a network of relations—with humans, with systems, with
nature. At the same time, to recognise this does not imply that they are
condemned to passivity and that they have no responsibility whatsoever for their
actions. For example, consumers of oil are not absolutely and not directly
responsible for oil production disasters, of course, but they might carry a small
degree of moral responsibility for disasters like Deepwater Horizon to the extent
that they beneﬁt from the oil (production continues if demand continues) and
since nowadays they have—in principle—the possibility to inform themselves of
the consequences of their actions.
When an accident happens, then, responsible technological action has the two-
fold aspect of fatalism and activity. On the one hand, the actors involved should
cope with technological risk by means of activity: when something goes wrong, try
to do something about it. For example, actors try to cope with a crisis on an oil
production platform. This corresponds to the engineering attitude to problems: try to
‘ﬁx’ the problem. They should also try to inform ourselves of the known risks
related to their actions and take action to avoid disasters. In the Deepwater Horizon
case, for example, many risks were known but it appears that insufﬁcient action was
taken to avoid the problems that led to the disaster. On the other hand, the actors
also have to accept that they cannot fully control or foresee the consequences of
their actions and therefore act prudentially in the light of that knowledge (the
knowledge ‘that we know nothing’—or at least much less than we would want to).
They should also accept and take into account dependence on others and on the
natural environment—accept this as their problem, as individuals and as teams or
organisations.
Given this ‘tragic’ character of technological action those who respond to
engineering disasters should not apply an ethics that is ‘strict and harsh’: they
should not ascribe full individual responsibility, but consider the distributed and
shared character of technological action and take into account the conditions of
relative rather than absolute control and knowledge.
However, we should not only consider the question of responsibility when the
accident already happened (backward-looking responsibility); we should also take
measures to create more responsible technological action in the future (forward-
looking responsibility). This requires the construction of more epistemic transpar-
ency, more knowledge of what they are doing (in terms of the scope of action).
Engineering and technology management (including risk management) are not
individual but collective enterprises that stand in need of collective, pooled
intelligence in order to contribute to responsible technological action. But
recognising the tragic character of engineering also requires acknowledging that
even then accidents might happen; there is no such thing as full control in the case
of technological action.
Let me now further clarify and develop my argument by considering the
personal, experiential dimension of engineering and technological action.
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Moral Responsibility
Most contemporary accounts of technological and engineering action come in the
form of ‘objective’ reports. Think about accident investigation reports, risk
assessment studies, and other narratives that aim at an ‘objective’ rendering of ‘the
facts’. For example, in response to the Deepwater Horizon disasters several
investigation reports are being written. This is very helpful but the kind of
knowledge constructed by these reports misses attention for the tragic aspect as
outlined above. Therefore, I propose to complement these narratives with narratives
that shift the focus from the object to the subject. Let me provide some examples of
experiences of the tragic in contemporary technological practices and discuss the
implications for responsibility. The subject of the experience can be the user,
designer or policy maker. What matters here is not ‘the facts’ but the experiences of
the individuals—in particular experiences of and coping with the tragic.
Helplessness
Sometimes we cannot do much when things go wrong. Our computer crashes and
we feel helpless. We try to implement a policy but the technology appears to
become an autonomous force and seeks its own ways out of the framework we
designed. We design something but it is used for something entirely different than
we intended to. In these cases, to ascribe full responsibility on the basis of the
control condition would be inadequate, since our possibilities to act are severely
limited. At most, we can hold someone responsible for what he or she has done in
the past in order to try to prevent the bad thing to happen. But even then it is not
always clear quite how much one should have ‘tried’ in order to have acted
responsibly, given that one had incomplete knowledge. In the Deepwater Horizon
case, for example, BP has been accused of not having taken enough measures to
prevent a blowout. Whether or not this is true, such explanations and accusations
give us little insight into the experiences of helplessness and personal struggles of
the people involved.
The Unexpected and Uncertainty
One form in which the problem of incomplete knowledge comes is in the context of
prediction. Our technological-bureaucratic systems try to predict the future. We try
to analyse risks and try to predict technological developments. But our epistemo-
logical basis for making such predictions is always shaky. Technological-social
systems are extremely complex, we cannot control for everything that can happen in
human-technology interaction at individual and system levels. Uncertainty is a
fundamental feature of such systems. There will always be blind spots. (For
example, offshore oil production involves a complex socio-technological system
that is highly vulnerable.) Therefore, to hold someone absolutely responsible for
something he or she could not have known is not fair. Again, at most one should
hold someone responsible for what he or she has done to try to prevent the
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or could have acquired—indeed should have acquired. This ‘should have acquired’
criterion
8 is a difﬁcult one and needs interpretation in particular cases. For example,
someone might argue that it was not her task to gather that information. This leads
me to the next problem.
Conﬂicting Roles
Sometimes our roles conﬂict when we have to act and take decisions. As a manager,
we might prioritize proﬁt, market share and organisational expansion in a particular
case, whereas as an engineer we might prioritize safety in that same case (although
this is not necessarily the case.). As an internet user, we might want to download
music for free, whereas as a musician we might want some ﬁnancial reward if others
download our music. Who is responsible in these cases? Me-as-an-engineer or me-
as-a-manager? Me-as-a-parent or me-as-a-politician? Conﬂicting roles are not so
much due to conﬂicting intentions but to conﬂicting expectations. Often it is
impossible to meet all demands, as Antigone already experienced in Sophocles’s
play: she had to choose between obeying the gods (religious demands) and obeying
Creon (demands of the law, the state). How can I be held absolutely responsible for
not doing A given that there was a strong pressure on me to do B? At most, I am
partly responsible. For example, if engineers feel under pressure not to install an
expensive safety measure (e.g. an expensive blowout preventer) in order to save
costs, they are partly responsible but responsibility is also shared by those who
create, execute, and beneﬁt from business models that prioritize cost reduction and
proﬁt maximalisation at the expense of safety.
Dependency and Collective Action
Technological action is highly dependent on others. It is relational: what is done
depends on what happens at other nodes in the socio-technological network. Often
that collective and relational aspect is made explicit, but even if this is not the case,
what we do always depends on what others do. Technological action is also
distributed and often collective. Therefore, to hold one individual responsible for a
technological action that goes wrong is unfair. Responsibility should also be
understood as relational, distributed, and collective. Once more this leaves no room
for a concept of absolute and individual responsibility.
The relational aspect means not only that responsibility is shared and distributed
(which answers the question who is responsible?) but also that those who are
responsible are answerable to particular audiences and communities. For example,
in the Deepwater Horizon case BP should be answerable to the families of those
who died or were injured, to the ﬁshermen at the coast whose jobs are endangered (it
has been reported that one of them committed suicide). The US government has to
be answerable to citizens who question lacking regulation. Such a relational
8 Note that this criterion shows that the line between description and normativity fades when it comes to
the epistemic condition for responsibility.
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made in the philosophical literature.
Lack of Full Control
Philosophical models of responsibility are usually of the arm-lifting type: I decide
whether or not I lift my arm, therefore I am responsible for lifting it. Conditions for
responsibility are of the negative freedom type: no one interferes with me when I lift
my arm (‘external’ negative freedom), there is no demon telling me what to do and
no mad scientist manipulating my brain (‘internal’ negative freedom), and there is a
lack of conﬂict between desires (volitional harmony). However, the problem with
technological action is that all these conditions can be fulﬁlled but that still I lack
control over the action since it is not exclusively ‘my’ action and I cannot predict
the consequences of the action since it depends on others and on what goes on
elsewhere. In this sense, technological action has no clearly limited scope: there is
no ﬁxed limit to the agency involved and there is no ﬁxed limit to the action since
the scope of its consequences cannot be controlled. For example, offshore energy
production is ‘done’ by many people, related to many sociotechnological systems
10
like oil distribution networks and ﬁnancial structures, and—as the Deepwater
Horizon case shows—has consequences that reach beyond the oil sector. The result
is that responsibility can no longer be kept within the boundaries of the (bodily)
movements of the individual agent or organisation, but spills over into other
‘compartments’. If engineers, managers, and others involved in a particular
technological action fail to acknowledge the scope of that action, for example by
saying and thinking that ‘this is not my problem’, then they act irresponsible.
Unless, of course, they did not know what they were doing. As noted previously, it
becomes increasingly difﬁcult to know what we are doing, although that does not
relieve us from the responsibility to acquire knowledge.
Choice When No Option is ‘Right’
Even if one knew the consequences of one’s action, if technological action was an
individual matter, and if one had enough control to allow one to make a decision,
one could ﬁnd oneself in the situation of having to choose between two alternatives
which are both ‘wrong’. This is a ‘tragic’ situation in the sense of having to make a
choice between two or more ‘bads’. Consider again Antigone’s choice situation.
Technology often creates such choice situation. For example, today medical
technology often creates situation in which one has to decide to prolong life or to let
someone die (end of life decisions) or situations in which one has to decide whether
or not to give life to someone (beginning of life decisions). Similar life-and-death
decisions may occur in technological disasters. Consider again the example of oil
platforms. In case of emergency a platform manager may have to make a decision
9 See for example the work of Duff and others on legal responsibility (Duff 2007).
10 The term is used in social studies of science and technology and refers to the strong connection
between the human, social aspect and the technical aspect of technological action.
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tragic in the speciﬁc Kierkegaardian sense proposed in this paper, since they
reveal technological action as situated between activity and passivity. The
situation creates a kind of ‘destiny’ in the sense that one’s options are pre-
conﬁgured and in the sense that one has to choose. Yet at the same time there is
room for freedom since one still has a choice between options (the consequences
of which one can try to imagine) and since one can expand the range of options
by using one’s moral imagination. If there was no choice at all and no possibility
to expand the range of options, the action would cease to be tragic since the
tension between activity and passivity would be lost. However, when questions
regarding responsibility are asked, such situations are almost excluded by
deﬁnition. The question of moral responsibility can only arise if the situation is
sufﬁciently tragic in the sense explained above.
Note that whether or not one is in full control is not (just) a matter of ‘objective’
facts or state of affairs, but also depends on one’s personal experiences. This makes
the problem of responsibility in a technological culture even more complex and
requires us to develop new and innovative moral epistemologies.
Conclusion
Recognizing the tragic dimension in these technological actions and experiences
does not justify evading moral responsibility; it does not promote fatalism or
passivity. I deﬁned the tragic as being about the tension between fate (and
passivity) and trying to do something about it (activity). I conclude that this way
of understanding technological experience and action inspires a concept of moral
responsibility that is less ‘harsh’ (Kierkegaard) and works in the real world.
Given the nature of technological experience and action in a complex
sociotechnological world, the traditional conception of responsibility modelled
on the legal-religious culture of the past (guilty or not guilty)
11 is no longer
adequate. The control condition, which is in line with this culture, is deeply
problematic. Usually it is inappropriate to say that someone is either absolutely
responsible or absolutely not responsible. Responsibility with regard to techno-
logical experience and action is distributed and is a matter of degree. Moreover,
understanding and ascribing that kind of responsibility depends on understanding
the tragic and personal character of the experiences and actions concerned.
Exercising that responsibility also depends on understanding what one is doing,
understanding one’s world. This sets the task of (further) developing better moral
epistemologies than the ones we inherited from the past, which may lead to more
adequate backward-looking and forward-looking responsibility ascriptions.
Finally, this discussion yields the insight that the practice of moral responsibility
ascription is not threatened by acknowledging the tragic character of human
action but instead presupposes it.
11 For a critique of legal responsibility see Coeckelbergh (2010b).
From Kierkegaard to Offshore Engineering 47
123Acknowledgment I would like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for their comments on
previous drafts of this paper.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-
commercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any med-
ium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Aristotle. (1925). Nicomachean Ethics. (W. D. Ross, Trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Coeckelbergh, M. (2010a). Imagining worlds: Responsible engineering under conditions of epistemic
opacity. In: Poel, I. & Goldberg, D. (Eds.), Philosophy and engineering: An emerging agenda.
Dordrecht: Springer.
Coeckelbergh, M. (2010b). Criminals or patients? Towards a tragic conception of moral and legal
responsibility. Criminal Law and Philosophy, 4(2), 233–244.
Coeckelbergh, M., & Wackers, G. (2007). Imagination, distributed responsibility, and vulnerability: The
case of Snorre A. Science and Engineering Ethics, 13(2), 235–248.
Davis, M. (1991). Thinking like an engineer: The place of a code of ethics in the practice of a profession.
Philosophy & Public Affairs, 20(2), 150–167.
de Mul, J. (2006). De domesticatie van het noodlot: De wedergeboorte van de tragedie uit de geest van de
technologie. Kampen: Klement.
Duff, A. (2007). Answering for crime: Responsibility and liability in the criminal law. Oxford: Hart
Publishing.
Harris, C. E. (2008). The good engineer: Giving virtue its due in engineering ethics. Science and
Engineering Ethics, 14(2), 153–164.
Heidegger, M. (1953). Die Frage nach der Technik [‘The Question Concerning Technology’ in The
Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays] (William Lovitt, Trans.). New York: Harper
and Row, 1977.
Kierkegaard, S. (1843). ‘The ancient tragical motif as reﬂected in the modern’ in Either/or: A fragment of
life (Vol. 1) (D. F. Swenson & L. M. Swenson, Trans.). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944.
Lenk, H., & Maring, M. (2001). Responsibility and technology. In A. E. Auhagen & H.-W. Bierhoff
(Eds.), Responsibility. The many faces of a social phenomenon. London: Routledge.
Nagel, T. (1979). ‘Moral luck’ in Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Nietzsche, F. (1872). Geburt der Trago ¨die aus dem Geiste der Musik [The birth of tragedy from the spirit
of music] (S. Whiteside, Trans.). London: Penguin Books, 1993.
Nihle ´n Fahlquist, J. (2006). Responsibility ascriptions and vision zero. Accident Analysis and Prevention,
38(6), 1113–1118.
Nussbaum, M. C. (1986). The fragility of goodness: Luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Pattison, G. (2000). The later Heidegger. London: Routledge.
Sher, G. (2006). Out of control. Ethics, 116(2), 285–301.
Steiner, G. (1961). The death of tragedy. London: Faber and Faber.
48 M. Coeckelbergh
123